On December 15, 2021, the SEC proposed amendments to the regulation (Rule 2a-7) governing money market funds.

The proposed amendments are intended to reduce run risk, mitigate the liquidity externalities transacting investors impose on non-transacting investors, and enhance the resilience of money market funds.”

The proposing release has not yet been published in the Federal Register, so we do not know when the sixty-day comment period will begin.

The most significant proposals would (1) eliminate the power of a money market fund’s board of directors or trustees (its “Board”) to temporarily suspend, or impose liquidity fees on, redemptions and (2) require money market funds with fluctuating net asset values per share (known as “institutional money funds”) to implement “swing pricing.” This post explains this swing pricing proposal.

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently provided a long-promised and needed update, in the form of a proposed rule, to guidance on determining the fair value of securities held by registered investment companies. Although the Investment Company Act of 1940 tasks the boards of directors of these funds with determining in good faith the fair

In our previous post, we reviewed how the financial markets’ reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic requires mutual funds to review, and possibly reclassify, the liquidity of their investments. As liquidity and valuation are often two sides of the same coin, factors that may lead to reclassifying a security’s liquidity may also raise questions concerning how to value the security for purposes of calculating a mutual fund’s net asset value (“NAV”). This post discusses when this may be the case.

I. DERIVATIVES ISSUES

1. Inventory “relationship level” considerations in legal documentation that governs your derivatives trading relationships (ISDA Master Agreements, Futures Customer Agreements, Master Securities Forward Transaction Agreements, etc.)

a. Example: Decline in Net Asset Value Provisions (Common in ISDAs)

i. Identify the trigger decline levels and time frames at which transactions under the agreement can be terminated (25% over a 1-month period – is that measured on a rolling basis or by reference to the prior month’s end?)

ii. Confirm whether all or only some transactions can be terminated (typically, it is all transactions)

iii. Identify the notice requirements that apply when a threshold is crossed

iv. Identify whether the agreement includes a “fish or cut bait clause” that restricts the ability of the other party to designate the termination of the transactions under the trading agreement

In the first part of this post, I explained how trading odd lot MBS can create the same valuation issue as trading PIPEs. I also touched on some important differences between MBS and PIPEs. In this part, I’ll examine why these differences may make the valuation of odd lot MBS more problematic than the valuation of PIPEs. The Order is significant for investment advisers as well as investment companies, insofar as the SEC asserted that PIMCO’s valuation procedures violated Rule 206(4)-7.

The SEC’s recent settlement (the “Order”) with Pacific Investment Management Company (“PIMCO”) reflects a new twist on an old issue: buying securities at bargain prices and then marking them up when calculating NAVs. The SEC first addressed this issue in 1969 in the context of what we now refer to as “PIPEs.” The first part of this post examines the similarities and differences between PIPEs and the mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) addressed in the Order. The second part explains why “odd lot” MBS may be more problematic than PIPES.