On November 2, 2022, the SEC proposed wide-ranging changes to how open-end investment companies (other than exchange traded funds and money market funds, “Funds”) process and price shareholder transactions and manage their corresponding liquidity risks (the “Proposal”). This post attempts to summarize key elements of the Proposal as a precursor to our analysis of its merits. “Attempts” is the apt term, as the Proposal would involve substantial revisions to multiple rules and disclosure forms, which makes organizing our summary a challenge.
I was looking for something else on the Division of Investment Management’s (Division) website the other day and ran across a study of Prime MMFs’ Asset Composition and Asset Sales (the Study) released by its Analytics Office in June. Nothing indicates why the Study was prepared, but I hope it reflects an effort by the Division to better understand how prime institutional money market funds operate and the potential consequences of the proposal to require these funds to employ “swing pricing” whenever they have net redemptions. The Study supports my conclusion that this proposal would dilute redeeming shareholders rather than preventing dilution to remaining shareholders.
Comments on the SEC’s proposed money market fund reforms were due April 11, so it is time to wrap up my series on the swing pricing proposal included in the reform package. In this final post, I want to consider some baffling references to “liquidity externalities that money market fund liquidity management practices may impose on market participants transacting in the same asset classes.” I cannot find an interpretation of these references that comport with my understanding of “externalities.”
This continues my series of posts on the SEC’s proposal to require money market funds with floating net asset values (“institutional money funds”) to implement swing pricing during any pricing period in which the fund has net redemptions. In this post, I consider the effects of swinging a price too frequently.
This continues my series of posts on the SEC’s proposal to require money market funds with floating net asset values (“institutional money funds”) to implement swing pricing during any pricing period in which the fund has net redemptions. Having surveyed how institutional money funds are supposed to determine swing prices under the proposal, I am turning to when swing pricing would be required. First, I want to consider a unique feature of institutional money funds, namely that many funds calculate a floating net asset value per share (“NAV”) more than once a day. The proposed amendments would define the time from the calculation of one NAV to the next as a “pricing period.” Pricing periods pose two conflicting problems for swing pricing.
This continues my series of posts on the SEC’s proposal to require money market funds with floating net asset values (“institutional money funds”) to implement swing pricing during any pricing period in which the fund has net redemptions. Having address the estimated costs that institutional money funds must always include in their swing price, this post considers the “market impact factor” to be included when net redemptions exceed the market impact threshold. I suspect the SEC underestimated the difficulty of estimating market impact factors.
In our previous post, we reviewed how the financial markets’ reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic requires mutual funds to review, and possibly reclassify, the liquidity of their investments. As liquidity and valuation are often two sides of the same coin, factors that may lead to reclassifying a security’s liquidity may also raise questions concerning how to value the security for purposes of calculating a mutual fund’s net asset value (“NAV”). This post discusses when this may be the case.
During a recent webinar, Steve explained that the market and trading conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic might be “reasonably expected to materially affect one or more of [a mutual fund’s] investments’ classifications” for purposes of the fund’s liquidity risk management program (its “LRM Program”). In this circumstance, Rule 22e-4 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires more frequent review of these classifications. This post describes how a rough market may require a mutual fund (other than a money market fund or in-kind exchange traded fund) to reclassify an investment’s liquidity classification.
Another day, another expansion of the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (the “Facility”) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (“FRBB”). As before, I’ve updated my original post to conform to the current program. There is now a website with a full set of documents, so I’ve updated the link to that website. The…
Yesterday I posted a summary of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (the “Facility”). Today it expanded the Facility to include tax exempt money market funds and municipal securities. Rather than write a separate post, I updated my original post so all the information is in one place and up to date. The blog editor does not have search functions, so forgive me if I haven’t removed every reference to “Prime” or inserted “Muni” in every appropriate spot.
A favorite client has also furnished me with a companion no-action letter obtained by the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”). I cannot link to the letter because I have not found it on either the SEC’s or ICI’s website. The letter is summarized below.